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I. INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages are “exotic” in a civil law system,1 and the 
Louisiana Civil Code articles on conflict of laws may be acting as a 
Trojan Horse,2 sneaking punitive damages into Louisiana’s civil 
law.3 Although Louisiana claims to have a strong legislative policy 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by BROOKSIE L. BONVILLAIN. 
 1. Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887). 
 2. The Louisiana Legislature’s debate of Senate Bill 646 proposing the 
codification of Louisiana’s choice-of-law provisions during the 1990 Legislative 
Session raised the concern that the articles could be the “[T]rojan [H]orse” 
introducing punitive damages into Louisiana law. Letter from Symeon Symeonides, 
Committee Reporter, Louisiana State Law Institute Conflicts Projet, to the Louisiana 
State Law Institute Conflicts Projet Committee (Dec. 19, 1990) (on file with the 
Louisiana State Law Institute). 
 3. Louisiana does allow punitive damages in limited statutory exceptions. 
See infra Part II.A.2. 
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against punitive damages,4 these articles enable courts to apply 
punitive damages laws from other jurisdictions in damages awards 
granted in Louisiana.5 When presented with this issue in Arabie v. 
CITGO Petroleum Corp.,6 the Louisiana Supreme Court reached the 
correct result; however, the lower courts’ analyses7 show how 
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws articles can be misapplied to sneak 
punitive damages into Louisiana in similar claims that are still being 
tried.8 Such awards generate concerns over inconsistent codal 
interpretation, forum shopping, substantive and procedural clashes, 
and corporate exposure to damages above and beyond what 
Louisiana’s substantive law would typically allow.9 This Trojan 
Horse creates the need for legislative clarification of the interaction 
among the conflict-of-laws articles governing punitive damages in 
order to align awards of punitive damages in Louisiana in 
accordance with legislative intent.10 
This Comment explains why there is a need to reform Louisiana 
law governing multistate tort conflicts. The Louisiana Legislature 
needs to amend the conflict-of-laws articles to limit situations in 
which courts may award punitive damages outside of Louisiana’s 
statutory exceptions.11 Accordingly, Part II of this Comment 
summarizes Louisiana’s punitive damages and conflict-of-laws 
provisions and compares Louisiana’s provisions to that of other 
jurisdictions.12 Part III then traces the path established by Arabie v. 
CITGO Petroleum Corp., highlighting the flawed analysis at all 
three levels of litigation.13 Finally, Part IV analyzes the Louisiana 
courts’ decision-making processes and underlying motives for 
awarding punitive damages and then offers a legislative solution to 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn, 409 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. La. 
1976); Karavokiros v. Ind. Motor Bus Co., 524 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. La. 1981); see 
also Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012). 
 5. See infra Parts II.B.2, IV.A−B. 
 6. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307; Arabie v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 
(La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 7. See Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307; Arabie, 49 So. 3d 529. 
 8. See Evans v. TIN, Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–
2348, 11–2351, 11–2417, 11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–
3048, 11–3049, 12–18, 11–3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012); 
infra Part V.A. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part IV.B. 
 11. See infra Parts IV.A.2, V.B. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); Arabie v. 
CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010). See infra Part IV. 
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the flawed articles on the conflict of laws to definitively close the 
door to punitive damages.14 
II. OPENING THE DOOR TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A COMPARATIVE 
OVERVIEW OF LOUISIANA LAW 
Louisiana purports to have a strong legislative policy against 
awarding punitive damages, except in limited statutorily excepted 
situations.15 The history of Louisiana’s policy on punitive damages is 
instructive because the courts and the Louisiana Legislature have 
disagreed on the legislative intent behind punitive damages over the 
past century.16 This overview details the codification of Louisiana’s 
conflict-of-laws provisions and compares Louisiana’s approach to 
those of other jurisdictions, paying particular attention to the 
treatment of punitive damages.17 Louisiana’s legislative policy 
restricting punitive damages is unique, and it should be preserved 
from erosion through codal loopholes that open the door to the 
inappropriate award of punitive damages under the law of foreign 
jurisdictions.  
A. Louisiana Law on Punitive Damages 
Louisiana traditionally disfavors the award of punitive 
damages.18 This is a minority position on punitive damages among 
American states,19 as this policy is rooted in the civil law rather than 
the common law.20 In the civil law, an award of damages is meant to 
“repair the harm sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to 
punish the wrongdoer.”21 Accordingly, as a civilian jurisdiction, 
Louisiana has “been reluctant to open its doors” to allow the 
recovery of punitive damages.22 
                                                                                                             
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See generally John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana 
Punitive Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579 (2010).  
 16. See generally id. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See generally deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15. 
 19. See infra note 28. 
 20. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 579. 
 21. See id. at 580 (citing SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 7.6, in 6 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 205 (2d ed. 1999)); see also 2 LINDA L. 
SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 22.2 (5th ed. 2005); John Y. Gotanda, Punitive 
Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 396–98 
(2004). 
 22. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 580 (citing LITVINOFF, 
supra note 21, at 198); see also Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages–A European 
Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741 (2008). 
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1. The Louisiana Supreme Court: Closing the Door to Punitive 
Damages  
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 was silent on punitive 
damages.23 The courts awarded punitive damages without a 
statutory basis in ten reported decisions from 1836 to 1917.24 These 
unsupported awards spurred the desire for a statutory basis to justify 
awards of punitive damages, and Louisiana courts argued the issue 
of punitive damages for many years.25 In 1917, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court finally laid the issue to rest in Vincent v. Morgan’s 
Louisiana26 by holding that “pecuniary penalties imposed as 
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages” were not recoverable 
under Louisiana law.27 
2. The Louisiana Civil Code: Cracking the Door to Punitive 
Damages 
After Vincent, the Legislature enacted three narrow statutory 
exceptions permitting awards of punitive damages, and this is the 
current state of Louisiana law on the subject.28 Still, Louisiana’s 
policy is far more restrictive than the majority of states that allow 
                                                                                                             
 23. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 583; see also Patrick J. 
Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. 
L. REV. 529 (2010). 
 24. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 583 n.30 (citing and 
discussing some of those cases (Casper v. Prosdame, 14 So. 317 (La. 1894); 
McFee v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R. Co., 7 So. 720, 722–23 (La. 1890); 
Rutherford v. Shreveport & Houston R.R. Co., 6 So. 644, 644 (La. 1889); 
Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887); Hill v. New Orleans, Opelousas & 
Great W. R.R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 292, 294 (La. 1855); Varillat v. New Orleans & 
Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 88 (La. 1855); Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 
La. Ann. 33, 38 (La. 1855); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447, 448 (La. 1852); 
McGary v. City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440, 440 (La. 1849); Summers v. 
Baumgard, 9 La. 161, 162 (1836).)); see also Adams v. J.E. Merit Constr., Inc., 
712 So. 2d 88, 90–91 (La. 1998). 
 25. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 583. The courts began 
citing article 2324.1 as a justification for punitive damages to allow the judge or 
the jury to have discretion over the award of punitive damages in the absence of a 
statutory basis, but there was no specific basis for punitive damages in this article. 
Id. Current article 2324.1 appeared as article 1928 in the Louisiana Civil Code of 
1825. Id. at n.31. Those decisions, which allowed the award of punitive damages, 
admitted that punitive damages have common law roots and described punitive 
damages as “exotic” in a civil law system. Id. at 581 n.12. The dissents in those 
decisions refuted punitive damages because they are against civil law tradition. Id. 
 26. Vincent v. Morgan’s La., 74 So. 541 (La. 1917). 
 27. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 585 (citing Vincent, 74 
So. at 549). 
 28. See id.; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7 (2013). 
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punitive damages.29 This strict limitation is rooted “in the protection 
of [Louisiana’s] judicial system . . . from what it might consider 
inherently speculative awards.”30  
Unless specific statutory authority to award punitive damages 
exists, Louisiana only allows the award of compensatory damages in 
tort cases.31 Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code sets forth 
general delictual liability for “[e]very act whatever of man that 
causes damage to another.”32 Damages awarded for delictual 
conduct under article 2315 are strictly limited to general damages 
and special damages, which include “loss of consortium, service, 
and society” and costs “directly related to a manifest physical or 
mental injury or disease.”33 These narrow bases for damages reflect 
the civilian goal of remedying wrongs, without punishing the 
wrongdoer.34 
However, three articles allow additional exemplary damages for 
statutorily excepted tortious conduct.35 Specifically, these articles 
only allow exemplary damages for exceptionally egregious torts, 
which are limited to child pornography, operation of a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated, and criminal sexual activity with a child.36 
Exemplary damages are synonymous with punitive damages, as they 
are meant to make an example out of the defendant for delictual 
conduct37 and may only be awarded upon proof of a heightened 
                                                                                                             
 29. ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & LORI S. NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A 
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.3, at 266–68 (2011). From a 
national perspective, states have three major variations on punitive damages, 
which in turn affect the choice-of-law analysis for multistate tort conflicts. First, 
four states generally disallow punitive damages. Borchers, supra note 23, at 531. 
Second, Louisiana and Massachusetts disallow punitive damages but provide 
exceptions for specific, statutorily excepted conduct. Id. Third, the remaining 
states, including Louisiana’s neighbors, allow punitive damages. Id. These states 
allow punitive damages as a matter of common law. See HAMMESFAHR & 
NUGENT, supra, at 266−68. 
 30. Pitmann v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 559 So. 2d 879 (La. Ct. App. 
1990).  Accord Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 457 So. 2d 193, 194−95 (La. Ct. App. 
1984). The Louisiana Civil Code provisions that make exceptions to allow the 
award of punitive damages mirror common law analytical techniques that import 
the framework for these awards. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 
579. 
 31. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 with id. arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. 
 32. Art. 2315. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 580 (citing LITVINOFF, 
supra note 21); see also SCHLUETER, supra note 21; Gotanda, supra note 21, at 
396−98. 
 35. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. 
 36. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. 
 37. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 588. 
2013] COMMENT 333 
 
 
 
standard of liability.38 The limited circumstances in which punitive 
damages may be recovered and the heightened standard of liability 
required for recovery further illustrate the Legislature’s intent to 
limit such awards.39 
Louisiana reaffirmed its policy against punitive damages in 1996 
when the Legislature repealed article 2315.3, a fourth statutory 
exception, which allowed “punitive damages in matters involving 
transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.”40 The repeal of 
article 2315.3 is also important to the treatment of cases asserting 
claims for punitive damages for delictual conduct involving 
hazardous or toxic substances, such as cases involving refinery spills 
like in Arabie.41 There is no longer a statutory exception for the 
award of punitive damages in this situation, leading plaintiffs to seek 
other authority for such awards.42 Consequently, some plaintiffs 
have turned to the codal provisions on conflict of laws as a 
substitute. 
B. Louisiana Law on Conflict of Laws  
In addition to lacking authorization for punitive damages, the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 was also silent on choice-of-law in 
multistate tort cases.43 Initially, Louisiana courts adjudged multistate 
                                                                                                             
 38. Articles 2315.3, 2315.4, and 2315.7 set the heightened standard of 
liability at “a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety” of the person 
or others. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. 
 39. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. 
 40. Philip Ackerman, Some Don’t Like it Hot: Louisiana Eliminates Punitive 
Damages for Environmental Torts, 72 TUL. L. REV. 327, 327 (1997); 
HAMMESFAHR & NUGENT, supra note 29, at 395–96. The Legislature repealed 
article 2315.3 to counteract the Louisiana Supreme Court’s judicial expansion of 
article 2315.3 in the Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co. case. See id. at 383 (citing Billiot v. 
B.P. Oil Co., 645 So.2d 604 (La. 1994) (overruled by Adams v. Merit Constr., 
Inc., 712 So. 2d 88 (La. 1998) and Act No. 432, 1995 La. Acts 1622)). The Billiot 
Court held that “an employee could seek punitive damages against an employer 
even though the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Statute provided employers 
with tort immunity.” See HAMMESFAHR & NUGENT, supra note 29, at 395–96 
(citing Billiot, 645 So. 2d 604). This created a loophole for employees to sue their 
employers, who were immune from compensatory damages, for punitive damages 
instead. Id. While article 2315.3 was also repealed for reasons such as preserving 
the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Statute and other political pressures, it 
nonetheless further restricted punitive damages recovery in Louisiana.  
 41. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); infra 
Part III. 
 42. This is particularly important for the purposes of this Comment because 
article 2315.3 formerly applied to refinery spills like the one in Arabie. Id. 
 43. Symeon Symeonides, Introductory Note: The State of Present Louisiana 
Jurisprudence 59 (July 2, 1989) (unpublished comment) (on file with the 
Louisiana State Law Institute). 
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torts by following the approach of other states under the rule of lex 
loci delicti, which dictates that the law of the place where the tort 
occurred should govern a rule of decision in a tort case.44 The rule of 
lex loci delicti fell under attack during the American conflicts 
revolution of the 1960s, and many jurisdictions denounced the rule.45 
Louisiana followed suit in 1973 when the Louisiana Supreme Court 
judicially abandoned the rule in Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.46 After 
Jagers, the place where the tort occurred no longer necessarily 
controlled which law applied.47 The Jagers Court clearly denounced 
the lex loci delicti rule but failed to provide a suitable replacement.48 
Without a clear rule to follow, Louisiana lower courts applied a 
variety of inconsistent methods.49 The Louisiana State Law Institute 
undertook the task of creating a uniform body of law to streamline the 
various approaches. 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See generally Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973). 
 47. See Symeonides, supra note 43, at 59. In Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 
the Louisiana Supreme Court chose not to apply the rule of lex loci delicti. Id. 
(citing Jagers, 276 So. 2d 309); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana’s 
New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677, 
681 n.17 (1992). See generally Harvey Couch, Choice-of-Law, Guest Statutes, and 
the Louisiana Supreme Court: Six Judges in Search of a Rulebook, 45 TUL. L. 
REV. 100 (1970) (offering insight into how the Court chose to abandon the lex loci 
delicti rule). Jagers arose from a car accident in Mississippi between two 
Louisiana family members. See Symeonides, supra note 43, at 59 (citing Jagers, 
276 So. 2d 309). Because Mississippi “had no interest” in applying its law to the 
particular issue of whether Louisiana family members could sue one another in 
tort, the Court refused to apply Mississippi law under the rule of lex loci delicti. Id. 
Mississippi law would have disallowed the suit through intra-family immunity. Id. 
The Court instead applied Louisiana law because Louisiana’s policy of 
compensation would have been affected if the court did not apply it to protect the 
Louisiana domiciliary, although the injury occurred in Mississippi. Id. Because the 
case did not involve a Mississippi family, Mississippi’s policy of protecting 
families from discourse would not be affected. Id. The Jagers Court considered 
the case to be a “false conflict” because only one of the states involved, Louisiana, 
truly “had an interest” in applying its own law. Id. A “true conflict” would be a 
case in which both states are interested in applying their law. Id. 
 48. See Symeonides, supra note 43, at 59 (citing Jagers, 276 So. 2d 309). 
 49. See id. at 59−60. Louisiana lower courts applied three methods of 
reasoning to reconcile multistate torts conflicts: (1) the government interest 
analysis, (2) the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws approach, and (3) a 
combination of the two methods. Id. See also James J. Hautot, Choice of Law in 
Louisiana: Torts, 47 LA. L. REV. 1109 (1987). Compare Sutton v. Langley, 330 
So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (government interest analysis), with Cooper v. 
American Express Co., 593 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1979) (the Restatement Second of 
Conflict of Laws analysis), Brinkley & West Inc., v. Foremost Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 
928 (5th Cir. 1974), and Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La. 1976) (a 
combination of the two methods).  
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1. Building the Trojan Horse: The Louisiana State Law 
Institute’s Projet 
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws codification was “the first 
comprehensive attempt at conflicts codification in the United 
States.”50 When the Louisiana State Law Institute prepared the 
Projet for the Codification of Louisiana Law of Conflict of Laws,51 it 
submitted its proposal of 36 new Louisiana Civil Code articles to the 
1990 Regular Legislative Session.52 During the course of debate in 
the Louisiana House of Representatives, the tort articles were the 
most controversial.53 Concern arose that the Projet “might open the 
doors to obnoxious foreign laws . . . [and] be the ‘[T]rojan [H]orse’ 
for the introduction of punitive damages to Louisiana.”54 Due to its 
concerns, the House deferred the conflicts Projet and recommended 
the addition of an article that would allow Louisiana courts to refuse 
foreign law if it “would produce a result that is repugnant to 
Louisiana’s public policy.”55 The Institute’s Advisory Committee 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 678. Prior to Louisiana’s codification, 
conflicts rules were found in Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 articles 9 and 10, 
revised statutes, and jurisprudence. Id. There was no specific rule for tort conflicts 
in the code articles. Id. Article 9 was meant to govern tort conflicts, but Louisiana 
courts followed lex loci delicti under the influence of its common law neighbors. 
Id. at 678−80.  
 51. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides, Committee Reporter, Louisiana 
State Law Institute Conflicts Projet, to the Louisiana State Law Institute Conflicts 
Projet Committee (Feb. 5, 1990) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute). 
The following members comprised the Institute’s Advisory Committee for the 
Codification of Louisiana Conflict of Laws: David Conroy, Harvey Couch, James 
L. Dennis, Cordell H. Haymon, Harry T. Lemmon, Howard W. L’Enfant, Andrew 
Rinker, Jr., Raphael J. Rabalais, Katherine S. Spaht, A.N. Yiannopoulos, staff 
attorney James J. Carter, Jr., and Committee Reporter Symeon C. Symeonides. See 
Symeonides, supra note 47, at 683 n.35.  
 52. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides to the Louisiana State Law Institute 
Conflicts Projet Committee, supra note 51. The Institute’s Advisory Committee 
for the Codification of Louisiana Conflict of Laws approved the proposed code 
articles, then submitted the proposal to the Council of the Institute. Id. The 
Council of the Institute approved the proposal as a whole on March 17, 1989. Id. 
Senators McLeod and Nelson introduced the proposal to the Louisiana Legislature 
as Senate Bill 646 during the 1990 Regular Legislative Session. Letter from 
Symeon C. Symeonides to the Louisiana State Law Institute Conflicts Projet 
Committee, supra note 2. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Senate, and 
the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee approved the Bill, but the House 
deferred the Bill for further study. Id. 
 53. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides to the Louisiana State Law Institute 
Conflicts Projet Committee, supra note 2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. The proposed additional article read as follows:  
Article ‘X’. Ordre public. When the law of another state is designated as 
applicable to an issue under the provisions of this Chapter, the 
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had considered such an article prior to its first legislative proposal 
and decided to omit it because the committee believed that “the 
flexibility . . . built into [the Projet] permit[ted] and require[d] the 
judge to take account of Louisiana’s public policy in every, not just 
the last, step of the choice-of-law analysis.”56  
The Committee also faced the question of “what effect punitive 
damages [would] have on the tort law in Louisiana.”57 Professor 
Symeon Symeonides, the Committee Reporter, promptly assuaged 
this concern and responded that “the intent of the Projet’s drafters 
was precisely not to affect at all Louisiana’s substantive law on the 
issue.”58 He further explained that “[t]he Projet simply delineate[d], 
and [did] so in a very conservative manner, the circumstances under 
which punitive damages may be awarded, if and when such 
damages are imposed by a—usually foreign—law that is otherwise 
applicable to the dispute.”59  
The Committee resubmitted the original Projet for the 1991 
Regular Legislative Session but failed to adopt the recommended 
article that would ensure that Louisiana’s longstanding public policy 
against punitive damages was explicitly protected in multistate tort 
conflicts.60 The Legislature adopted the Projet, and the articles were 
then added to the Louisiana Civil Code as Book IV Conflict of 
                                                                                                             
 
application of such law may be refused [only] if it would lead to a result 
that is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of 
this State as understood in interstate or international relations. 
Id. 
 56. Id. In response, the Institute’s Advisory Committee for the Codification of 
Louisiana Conflict of Laws insisted that:  
the Projet: (a) [did] not change an iota in Louisiana’s policy against 
punitive damages; (b) . . . delineate[d] more narrowly than any other 
state, and more narrowly than present Louisiana jurisprudence, the cases 
in which punitive damages may be awarded under a foreign law that is 
otherwise applicable to the case (Art. 46); and (c) even in those cases, it 
allows the court to not award punitive damages if it determines that “the 
policies of another state [e.g. Louisiana] would be more seriously 
impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue [e.g. punitive 
damages]” (Art. 47.).  
Id. These were the original intended numbers for the enactment, but they were 
later renumbered. Id. Articles 46 and 47 were renumbered to be articles 3546 and 
3547. Id. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of their content. 
 57. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides, Committee Reporter, Louisiana 
State Law Institute Conflicts Projet, to Oliver P. Stockwell, attorney (Feb. 12, 
1990) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Act No. 923, 1991 La. Acts 251.  
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Laws.61 These articles remain the governing law regarding punitive 
damages in choice-of-law situations.62 
2. Hidden in the Trojan Horse: Allowing Punitive Damages 
Under the Current Conflict-of-Laws Articles  
Although the Projet drafters insisted that the conflicts 
codification insulated Louisiana law from punitive damages,63 the 
conflict-of-laws provisions nonetheless provide ample opportunity 
to recover punitive damages,64 in addition to the statutorily excepted 
provisions,65 because the choice-of-law articles governing an award 
of punitive damages in a Louisiana forum permit the application of 
another state’s law in limited circumstances.66  
Louisiana Civil Code Book IV “is based on the premise that the 
choice-of-law process should strive for ways to minimize the 
impairment of the involved states’ interests, rather than to maximize 
one state’s interests at the expense of those of the other states” 
through an analysis of policy and pertinent contacts.67 Book IV 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. Although the 36 articles adopted in Act Number 923 were numbered 
as articles 14 to 49, all but article 14 were adopted as articles 3515 to 3549 in a 
newly created Book IV Conflict of Laws to avoid renumbering Book I of the Civil 
Code. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 685−86 n.43. The Louisiana State Law 
Institute renumbered these articles through its statutory authority after Act Number 
923 was passed. Id. Articles 3542 through 3548 are the most important to the 
scope of this Comment. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3542−3548 (2013); infra Part 
II.B.2. 
 62. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3515−3549 (2013). 
 63. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 64. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); Arabie 
v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Evans v. TIN, 
Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–2348, 11–2351, 11–2417, 
11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–3048, 11–3049, 12–18, 11–
3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012). 
 65. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 66. See arts. 3542−3548. Article 14 on multistate cases provides that “[u]nless 
otherwise expressly provided by the law of this state, cases having contacts with 
other states are governed by the law selected in accordance with the provisions of 
Book IV of this Code.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 14 (2013). This article lays the 
foundation to apply the articles in Book IV to multistate tort cases, “whether these 
contacts pertain to the domicile of the parties, the transaction or the occurrence 
giving rise to the dispute, or the location of its object or subject matter.” See 
Symeonides, supra note 47, at 687. Article 14 is the only conflict-of-laws article 
that retains its original location in Book I of the Civil Code. Id. at 686. See infra 
note 62. 
 67. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 690. This analysis “is accomplished by 
identifying the state that, in light of its relationship to the parties and to the dispute, 
and the policies rendered pertinent by that relationship, would suffer the most 
serious legal, social, economic, and other consequences if the court did not apply 
its law to the issue.” Id. Louisiana Civil Code Book IV establishes the framework 
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begins with a general, residual rule on how to determine the 
applicable law. Article 3515 specifically provides that “an issue in a 
case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the 
state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law 
were not applied to that issue.”68 To make that determination, article 
3515 requires the court to consider “the strength and pertinence of 
the relevant policies of all involved states,”69 with special 
consideration for the relationship between the parties, the state 
policies involved, and the expectations of the parties.70  
Professor Symeonides warned that some policies “are more 
susceptible to being overlooked if they are not brought to the 
attention of the decisionmaker.”71 Another important consideration 
is that “the parties should not be subjected to a law whose 
application they had no reason to anticipate.”72 
In addition to the general, residual rule of article 3515, Book IV 
specifically addresses delictual obligations involving several 
                                                                                                             
 
for the application of its Title 7, which specifically governs conflict of laws for 
delictual and quasi-delictual obligations. See arts. 3542–3548.  
 68. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2013). 
 69. Id. The policies referenced in article 3515 “should include not only those 
embodied in the rules of law claimed to be applicable, but also the more general 
policies, domestic as well as multistate, that might be pertinent to the particular 
issue.” Symeonides, supra note 47, at 692. In fact, the original draft of article 3515 
included the language “the policies embodied in the particular rules of law claimed 
to be applicable as well as any other pertinent policies of the involved states,” but 
the Louisiana State Law Institute’s Semantics Committee replaced the phrase with 
“relevant policies” because it thought the lengthier version was redundant. Id. at 
693 n.86 (quoting LOUISIANA STATE LAW INST., ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 
REVISION OF PRELIMINARY TITLE OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1870: LAW OF CONFLICTS 
OF LAWS: A PROJET 1 (Comm. Print 1989) (Symeon C. Symeonides, Committee 
Reporter, adopted Mar. 17, 1989) (on file with the Tulane Law Review); cf. 
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRATUMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE 
PROBLEMS 76−79, 376−78, 392, 394−95, 406−08 (1965)). The Institute’s 
Coordinating Committee made further non-substantive, semantical revisions after 
the passage of the proposal. Symeonides, supra note 43.  
 70. Art. 3515. Symeonides further described the policy consideration 
embodied in article 3515 as “[a] legislative policy that is strongly espoused by the 
enacting state for intrastate cases may in fact be attenuated in a particular 
multistate case that has only minimal contacts with that state.” Symeonides, supra 
note 47, at 693. Similarly, “the same policy may prove to be far less pertinent if 
the case has sufficient contacts with that state, but not contacts of the type that 
would actually implicate that policy.” Id. 
 71. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 694 n.35 (citing art. 3515). This is why 
the second paragraph of article 3515 expressly mentions “the policies of upholding 
the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences 
that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.” Id. 
 72. Id. at 695. 
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states.73 In particular, article 3546 addresses the treatment of 
punitive damages in a choice-of-law analysis for multistate torts.74 
Article 3546 reads:  
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this 
state unless authorized: 
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct 
occurred and by either the law of the state where the 
resulting injury occurred or the law of the place where 
the person whose conduct caused the injury was 
domiciled; or 
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and 
by the law of the state where the person whose conduct 
caused the injury was domiciled.75 
Thus, article 3546 specifically prohibits the award of punitive 
damages by a Louisiana court, unless the substantive law of a 
minimum of two of the three listed locations allows the award of 
punitive damages: (1) the place of the alleged injurious conduct, (2) 
the place of the alleged injury, or (3) the place of the defendant’s 
domicile.76 The language in article 3546 stating: “may not be 
awarded . . . unless” reaffirms Louisiana’s restrictive view on the 
authorization of punitive damages in multistate tort conflicts.77 
However, from the very text of article 3546, there is an oddity in the 
statutory exception allowing punitive damages in multistate torts 
because there are three clauses and two provisions.78 This allows 
parties to prepare alternative arguments within the three provisions 
in the text of the article, while only needing to satisfy two of the 
provisions, which allows wide latitude for an award of punitive 
damages in contrast with Louisiana’s limited statutory exceptions.79  
                                                                                                             
 73. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3542−3548 (2013). Article 3542 parallels article 
3515 and sets forth the general rule on multistate tort conflicts. Art. 3542. Article 
3542 explains that to determine which state’s policies would be the “most 
seriously impaired” if not applied, the analysis should first consider “the pertinent 
contacts of each state to the parties and the events giving rise to the dispute, 
including the place of conduct and injury, the domicile, habitual residence, or 
place of business of the parties, and the state in which the relationship, if any, 
between the parties was centered.” Id. Next, the analysis should look to “the 
policies referred to in article 3515, as well as the policies of deterring wrongful 
conduct and of repairing the consequences of injurious acts.” Id. 
 74. Art. 3546. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See infra Part III. 
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One of the most important determinations that must be made in 
any choice-of-law analysis, including claims for punitive damages, 
is the domicile of the parties. The general rule is that “[a] juridical 
person may be treated as a domiciliary of either the state of its 
formation or the state of its principal place of business, whichever is 
most pertinent to the particular issue.”80 However, in an effort to 
subject out-of-state tortfeasors to jurisdiction in Louisiana, “a 
juridical person that is domiciled outside this state, but which 
transacts business in this state and incurs a delictual . . . obligation 
arising from activity within this state, shall be treated as a 
domiciliary of this state,” as long as it is consistent with policy 
considerations enumerated under article 3542.81 The duality of these 
two domicile rules allows manipulation of their application based on 
which domicile is preferential to the particular plaintiff.82  
The defendant’s domicile is crucial to the analysis in a claim for 
punitive damages in a multistate tort conflict because it is a 
requirement for such awards under the law of another state.83 
Although an out-of-state tortfeasor “shall be domiciled” in 
Louisiana for delictual liability arising from activity within this 
state, plaintiffs may argue that policy concerns favor domiciling the 
corporation in a forum that allows punitive damages.84 If the court 
agrees that policy considerations indicate that the defendant should 
be domiciled in a state that allows an award of punitive damages and 
the plaintiff proves that either the injurious conduct or the resulting 
injury occurred in a state that allows punitive damages as well, the 
plaintiff may secure an award of punitive damages under another 
state’s law. Such an award circumvents the codal attempt to subject 
out-of-state actors to Louisiana law governing delictual liability in 
multistate torts.85  
Moreover, article 3547 on exceptional cases creates an “escape 
hatch” and allows the court to consider whether, under the totality of 
                                                                                                             
 80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3518 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. art. 3548. See also id. art. 3542 (promulgating the general rule 
governing delictual obligations). See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy 
considerations. 
 82. It is important to note that article 3548 dictates that a juridical person 
“shall” be domiciled in Louisiana if consistent with article 3542. Art. 3548. 
Professor Symeonides stressed that article 3548 may protect out-of-state 
corporations from punitive damages liability but only if the court agrees this is 
appropriate under article 3542. Arts. 3542, 3548. See Symeonides, supra note 47, 
at 762. See infra Part III for a discussion of the application of these articles in 
Arabie. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); Arabie v. 
CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 83. Arts. 3518, 3548. 
 84. Art. 3548. 
 85. Id. arts. 3546, 3548. 
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the circumstances, to apply the law of another involved state, 
irrespective of any other Civil Code provisions, if “it is clearly 
evident . . . that the policies of another state would be more seriously 
impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.”86 This 
“escape hatch” conflicts with Louisiana’s legislative policy to 
strictly limit the award of punitive damages because it enables 
plaintiffs to recoup punitive damages not allowed through 
Louisiana’s statutory exceptions and narrow choice-of-law 
provisions.87 
Although the conflict-of-laws articles provide courts with the 
tools to evaluate a multistate tort conflict through a step-by-step 
analysis, there are flaws hidden within the articles. These flaws 
became evident in the Arabie litigation.88 Plaintiffs and defendants 
need to know how to proceed with reasonable certainty when a 
Louisiana court may award punitive damages under the law of 
another state. Louisiana has a mainstream approach to choice-of-law 
in general,89 yet Louisiana takes the minority approach by expressly 
prohibiting punitive damages, creating policy concerns in a choice-
of-law analysis.90 The outcome of future multistate tort cases is 
currently unclear, which opens the door to years of litigation on the 
meaning of the choice-of-law articles in relation to punitive 
damages. This lack of clarity may further suggest the need for 
legislative clarification.91 
III. THE TROJAN HORSE ENTERS: ARABIE V. CITGO PETROLEUM 
CORP. 
Arabie was the first case involving the Louisiana choice-of-law 
provisions on punitive damages to reach the Louisiana Supreme 
Court.92 Arabie traveled from the Fourteenth Judicial District 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. art. 3547. The principles of article 3542 are used to consider “whether 
the policy of another state would be more seriously impaired it its law were not 
applied to the particular issue.” Id. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy 
considerations.  
 87. See, e.g., Cain v. Altec Industries, Inc., 236 F. App’x. 965 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(awarding damages under another state’s law using article 3547 to circumvent the 
application of Louisiana’s choice-of-law principles). Compare art. 3546, with art. 
3547 (allowing parties to circumvent codal requirements).  
 88. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Book IV. See infra Part III for a 
discussion of the Arabie litigation. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 
307 (La. 2012); Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the flaws in the code articles. 
 89. See supra Part II.B. 
 90. See supra Part II.A; infra Part IV.C. 
 91. See infra Part IV.B. 
 92. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307. 
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Court,93 to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal,94 and ultimately to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, which reversed the lower courts’ awards 
of punitive damages.95 However, despite the High Court’s 
seemingly definitive holding, the Court’s analysis and subsequent 
cases96 demonstrate the flaws in the conflict-of-laws provisions 
governing conduct and domicile that need legislative attention.97  
A. Sneaking in the Trojan Horse: The Trial Court’s Award of 
Punitive Damages 
The dispute in Arabie arose after CITGO Petroleum Corp. 
unintentionally released 4 million gallons of hazardous slop oil and 
17 million gallons of wastewater into the Calcasieu River in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana, in a refinery spill on June 19, 2006.98 The spill 
originated from the storm surge storage tanks in the refinery’s 
wastewater treatment unit (WWTU) built in 1994.99 The dike 
around the tanks failed to contain the spillage, and the 21 million 
gallons of oil and wastewater migrated downriver to the Ron 
Williams Construction site at the Calcasieu Refining Company 
where the plaintiffs were working.100 
Fourteen plaintiffs filed suit in Louisiana state court against 
CITGO and R & R Construction.101 Some who were directly 
                                                                                                             
 93. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. 2007-2738, 2009 WL 7170890 
(La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2009).  
 94. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 95. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307. 
 96. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of Evans v. TIN, Inc. Evans v. TIN, 
Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–2348, 11–2351, 11–2417, 
11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–3048, 11–3049, 12–18, 11–
3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012).  
 97. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of legislative 
proposals.  
 98. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 533.  
 99. Id. The function of the WWTU was to treat wastewater then discharge it 
into the Calcasieu River. Id. Two 10 million gallon storm tanks stored the 
untreated wastewater, but the skimmers designed to remove the oil from the 
wastewater had been inoperable since shortly after the WWTU was built. Id. Over 
time, eight feet of slop oil accumulated under the wastewater stored in the tanks. 
Id. This accumulation resulted in a capacity overload because the two tanks 
experienced heavy rainfall in a very short period of time. Id. 
 100. Id. In response to the accident, CITGO implemented a two-month cleanup 
project in proximity to Calcasieu Refining Company. Id. Booms absorbed the oil 
and were deposited into a dumpster called a roll-off box 30 feet from the 
plaintiffs’ break tent, where there were daily construction meetings. Id.  
 101. Id. The plaintiffs alleged negligence against R & R Construction, who had 
contracted to build a new levee system around a third storm water tank at 
CITGO’s WWTU. Id. CITGO entered a plea agreement in federal court for 
“Negligently Discharging a Pollutant from a Point Source into the Navigable 
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exposed to the slop oil claimed physical injuries such as vomiting, 
rashes, headaches, nausea, and eye, nose, and throat problems.102 
CITGO and R & R filed a joint admission of fault for the release of 
the slop oil.103 The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs for their 
compensatory damages if the plaintiffs were able to prove that the 
dike failure at the CITGO refinery in Louisiana proximately caused 
those damages.104 
Then, only after CITGO’s admission of fault, the plaintiffs 
amended their suit to include CITGO’s liability for punitive 
damages, in addition to compensatory damages.105 Plaintiffs 
asserted that CITGO was headquartered in Oklahoma, prior to 2004, 
when the corporation moved its headquarters to Texas.106 The 
plaintiffs alleged that CITGO intentionally underbuilt the Louisiana 
refinery’s WWTU based on corporate headquarters’ decisions.107 
Through this line of reasoning, plaintiffs attempted to use 
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws rules to claim that the corporate-
funding decisions made over the years in Oklahoma and Texas 
constituted the injurious conduct, therefore allowing an award of 
punitive damages under the law of either state.108 
                                                                                                             
 
Waters of the United States in violation of Title 33 of the United States Code” on 
September 17, 2008. Id. at 533−54. CITGO agreed to a criminal fine of $13 
million in exchange for the government agreeing not to prosecute additional 
criminal offenses related to the refinery spill. Id. at 534. Specific offenses known 
to the government included discharges of pollutants, Clean Air Act violations, 
record-keeping violations, and disposal and treatment violations. Id. The state trial 
court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of comparative 
fault of the plaintiffs, their employer, and the premise owner. Id. 
 102. Id. at 534. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. The defendants specifically agreed to “pay (upon final judgment after 
all appeals) plaintiffs for all their compensatory damages assessed to CITGO and 
R & R, if any, that plaintiffs [were] able to prove to the Court were proximately 
caused by such release from the CITGO refinery in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, 
on or about June 19, 2006.” Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. The plaintiffs cited corporate headquarters’ decision to delete a third 
storage tank in the original unit design in order to save millions of dollars in 
expenses made in the early 1990s as the injurious conduct. Id. CITGO had actually 
approved engineering for the addition of the WWTU’s originally deleted third 
tank in 2004 and approved funding for the third tank in 2005. Id. The plaintiffs 
argued that fund diversion to profit-centered projects was the reason the third tank 
was not functional at the time of the spill in 2006. Id. 
 108. Id. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the conflict-of-laws 
provisions on punitive damages. The trial was a bench trial because Louisiana law 
only provides for a jury trial in civil cases with damages claims above $50,000. 
See infra Part IV.C. Both Oklahoma law and Texas law permit punitive damages 
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The trial court awarded punitive damages in the amount of 
$30,000 to each of the plaintiffs.109 The court determined that two of 
the requisite three requirements under article 3546 were satisfied, 
namely (1) that the injurious conduct occurred in a state that allowed 
punitive damages and (2) that CITGO was also domiciled in that 
state.110 First, the trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the 
injurious conduct occurred through corporate decision-making at 
headquarters in Oklahoma and Texas.111 Second, the trial court 
determined that CITGO was domiciled at its corporate headquarters 
in Oklahoma at the time the WWTU was constructed and when the 
decision to delete the third tank was made.112 Relatedly, the court 
determined that after moving headquarters in 2004, CITGO was 
domiciled in Texas until the time of the refinery spill in 2006.113 
Thus, even though Louisiana law did not allow for punitive damages 
under the facts of the case, the trial court judge was able to award 
them under the conflict-of-laws provisions all the same.114 CITGO 
then appealed the award of punitive damages.115 
B. Grooming the Trojan Horse: The Appellate Court’s Affirmation 
of Punitive Damages 
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the 
punitive damages award despite CITGO’s argument that Louisiana 
law, rather than the law of Oklahoma or Texas, should have 
governed the award of punitive damages.116 The appellate court 
analyzed the issue under Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws articles and 
agreed that article 3546 authorized punitive damages because the 
plaintiffs established (1) that the law of the state of the injurious 
                                                                                                             
 
for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from the tortious conduct. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 
23, § 9.1 (Westlaw 2013); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 
2008); Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 551−52. 
 109. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 534, 554. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of 
article 3546. 
 110. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 551. The plaintiffs specifically argued for punitive 
damages under the law of Texas or Oklahoma. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 115. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 534. 
 116. Id. at 533, 551. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal only admonished the 
trial court on one issue: its failure to clarify whether it applied Texas or Oklahoma 
law for the award of punitive damages. Id. at 558. Otherwise, the appellate court 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. 
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conduct and (2) that the law of the state of the defendant’s domicile 
would permit an award of punitive damages.117 
First, in its analysis of injurious conduct, the appellate court 
agreed that CITGO’s refinery spill caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.118 
However, instead of finding that the injurious conduct that caused 
the refinery spill leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in 
Louisiana at the time of CITGO’s refinery spill, the appellate court 
deferred to the factual findings of the trial court, which determined 
that the injurious conduct occurred in Oklahoma and Texas at the 
time of corporate headquarters’ decisions.119 
Second, in its analysis of CITGO’s domicile, the court 
considered whether CITGO should be an out-of-state corporation 
domiciled in Louisiana or whether CITGO should be domiciled at 
its principle place of business in Oklahoma or Texas.120 CITGO 
argued that it should be a Louisiana domiciliary because, although 
its headquarters are in Texas, CITGO is a juridical person that 
transacts business in Louisiana and incurred delictual liability 
arising from activity in Louisiana.121  
The court rejected CITGO’s argument and concluded that 
CITGO was domiciled in Texas under an interest analysis122 that 
determined which state’s policies “would be most seriously 
impaired if its law were not applied to that issue” by weighing the 
“pertinent contacts of each state” to the parties and the events giving 
rise to the dispute against policy concerns,123 including the policies 
deterring wrongful conduct.124  
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. at 552. 
 118. Id. at 547. The court said that it found “no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court’s determination that CITGO’s spill of slop oil caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.” 
Id. 
 119. The court cited article 3546, comment (d), which leads to article 3543, 
comment (h) to evaluate conduct that occurred in more than one state. Id. at 552. 
The court relied on comment (h) to article 3543, which explains that where the 
injurious conduct occurred in more than one state, the case should be “approached 
under the principles of causation of the law of the forum” to legally “determine 
which particular conduct was . . . the principal cause of the injury.” Id. (citing LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3543 cmt. h (2013)). 
 120. Id. at 552. Article 3546, comment (d) led the court to articles 3518 and 
3548 governing domicile. Id. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of articles 
3518 and 3548. 
 121. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 552. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of articles 
3518 and 3548. 
 122. Article 3542 sets forth the interest analysis. See supra note 73 for a 
discussion of the policy considerations underlying article 3542. 
 123. Article 3515 sets forth important policy considerations for the article 3542 
interest analysis. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2013). 
 124. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 552 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542 (2013)). To 
consider the pertinent contacts component of article 3542, the court should 
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Under the first prong of the interest analysis, the appellate court 
considered the pertinent contacts and the events leading up to the 
dispute.125 The court conceded that CITGO had pertinent contacts 
with Louisiana, but it discounted the strength of these contacts by 
failing to identify any contacts supporting CITGO being a Louisiana 
domiciliary.126 Therefore, according to the appellate court, CITGO 
should be domiciled in Texas.127 The court next analyzed the events 
giving rise to the dispute.128 The appellate court agreed that 
CITGO’s corporate management intentionally underbuilt the 
WWTU because of corporate headquarters’ decisions in Oklahoma 
and Texas; then later corporate decisions caused construction delays 
resulting in a third tank not being complete by the time of the spill in 
2006.129 The court rejected CITGO’s counterarguments that the 
WWTU was not intentionally underbuilt and that the decisions to 
add a third tank occurred at the Louisiana refinery.130 
                                                                                                             
 
evaluate “the events giving rise to the dispute, including the place of conduct and 
injury, the domicile, habitual resident, or place of business of the parties, and the 
state in which the relationship, if any, between the parties was centered.” Id.  
 125. Id. at 552. 
 126. Id. The court relied upon the fact that CITGO is an international 
corporation with headquarters in Texas. Id. The court determined corporate 
headquarters in Texas to be the most pertinent contact by citing CITGO’s “Safety, 
Health, and Environmental Management Policy 80–100,” which dictates that 
“Executive Management of the Corporation establishes policies, approves 
standards and goals for performance, and reviews HS&E compliance for all 
facilities,” as well as being responsible for comprehensive reviews and assessment 
of its facilities. Id. at 552–53. 
 127. Id. at 553. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. Plaintiffs argued the following points in support of their argument that 
the events giving rise to the dispute occurred at corporate headquarters. Id. First, a 
memo dated August 15, 1992, indicated that employees from Tulsa headquarters 
visited Lake Charles with the intent to reduce the scope and cost of the WWTU. 
Id. Second, the 1994 deadline for the WWTU was extended to conduct cost 
reduction studies. Id. Third, seven items labeled “Wastewater Equipment 
Eliminated for Cost Reduction” were deleted from the original WWTU proposal. 
Id. This saved $35.3 million including $12 million for “One Stormwater Tank.” 
Id. Fourth, several near overflows and diversions of wastewater occurred when the 
WWTU opened. Id. Fifth, Lake Charles first suggested reassessing the WWTU 
capacity in 1996, with the first recommendation for a third tank in 2002. Id. Sixth, 
it took nearly a year between initial approval in May of 2004 until final approval 
in March of 2005 for funding to be approved for a third tank. Id. Seventh, 
construction on the third tank did not commence until spring of 2006 and was 
incomplete at the time of the spill on June 19, 2006. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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Under the second prong of the interest analysis,131 the court must 
weigh policy considerations,132 including the interests in deterring 
wrongful conduct and repairing the consequences of injurious 
acts.133 The appellate court denied Louisiana’s policy against 
punitive damages and chastised CITGO, claiming that they were 
“paint[ing] with too broad a brush and too heavy a hand.”134 The 
court said that “Louisiana does not have a policy of protecting all 
out of state defendants from their own state’s law.”135 Further, 
“Louisiana [does not] have an unswerving interest in rejecting all 
punitive damages,” which the court supported by citing the few 
                                                                                                             
 131. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations. 
 132. Article 3515 sets forth important policy considerations for the article 3542 
interest analysis. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2013). 
 133. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3515, 3542 (2013). The 
guidelines for the choice-of-law analysis balance  
the relevant policies of all involved states in light of: (1) the 
relationships of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the 
policies and needs of the interstate . . . systems, including the policies 
of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the 
adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the 
law of more than one state. 
Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 555 (emphasis added) (citing art. 3515). The appellate court 
determined that the state with the “higher standard of conduct” should be the law 
considered in issues of conduct and safety. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3543 
(2013). The court interpreted the “higher standard of conduct” to be the state law 
allowing punitive damages for negligent conduct, which would be Texas or 
Oklahoma. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 555. The court deferred to article 3543, comment 
(f) for an explanation as to why the law of Texas or Oklahoma should apply and 
outweigh Louisiana’s interest. Id. See art. 3543 cmt. f; Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 
555−56. The court moved to article 3543, comment (h), which suggests that the 
law should be determined “under the principles of causation of the law of the 
forum” in cases in which injurious conduct occurs in more than one state. Id. at 
556. See art. 3543 cmt. h. The comment stresses the determination of “the 
principal cause of injury” to decide upon application of the law or the state of 
injury or the state of conduct. Id. The comment provides two alternatives: deferral 
to article 3542 if the determination of causation is unclear or application of article 
3547 if the injurious conduct was not localized in any single state. Id. See id. arts. 
3542, 3547. 
 134. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. CITGO cited Commercial Union Insurance Co. 
v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp 453 (E.D. La. 1976), and Karavokiros v. Indiana 
Motor Bus Co., 524 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. La. 1981), to support its argument 
perpetuating Louisiana’s purported policy against punitive damages. Arabie, 49 
So. 3d at 554 (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co., 409 F. Supp. 453; Karavokiros, 
524 F. Supp. 385). The court dismissed CITGO’s argument regarding the 
Louisiana Legislature’s intent to restrict punitive damages in repealing article 
2315.3. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of former 
article 2315.3. The court cited article 3546 as the governing framework within the 
conflict-of-laws statutes to refute CITGO’s reliance on legislative policy. Id. at 
554. 
 135. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554 (emphasis added). 
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statutory exceptions in the Louisiana Civil Code: child pornography, 
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and criminal sexual 
activity with a child.136 Therefore, both prongs of the interest 
analysis weighed in favor of CITGO being an out-of-state 
domiciliary.137 
The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s award of 
punitive damages.138 However, the appellate court failed to 
thoroughly analyze all of the relevant choice-of-law considerations 
that would determine that the injurious conduct occurred in 
Louisiana and favor CITGO as a Louisiana domiciliary, which 
would have resulted in a reversal of the trial court’s award of 
punitive damages.139 CITGO then successfully sought a writ of 
certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court.140 
C. Closing the Door to the Trojan Horse: The Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s Denial of Punitive Damages 
The Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ award 
of punitive damages in a splintered decision.141 The Court performed 
a detailed analysis of the punitive damages awarded under 
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions.142 The Court identified 
legislative intent, beginning with the language of the statute, as the 
fundamental question because the core issue in the punitive damages 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. (emphasis added). The Third Circuit reasoned that punitive damages 
were permissible not only under article 3546 but under four articles in the 
Louisiana Civil Code as well. Id. at 551. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 
2315.7 (2013). See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the statutory exceptions to 
punitive damages in Louisiana. 
 137. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. See supra Part 
II.A.2 for a discussion of the statutory exceptions to punitive damages in 
Louisiana. 
 138. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 557. The court relied on articles 3515, 3518, 3542, 
3543, and 3546. Id. at 556. Both the trial court and the appellate court reserved 
application of article 3547 as a fallback provision to award punitive damages in 
addition to the other conflict-of-laws articles. Id. The court decided that there was 
no conflict of laws between Texas and Oklahoma; the court ultimately chose to 
apply Texas law because it had the greater interest in enforcing its own law as the 
current domicile of CITGO. Id. The court cited article 3543 on the point of no true 
conflict between Texas and Oklahoma. Id. The court cited article 3542 and 3546 
for further support on applying Texas law under an interest analysis. Id. 
 139. Id. at 529. 
 140. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012). 
 141. Id. Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices 
Guidry, Weimer, Victory, and Chief Justice Kimball. Id. Justice Guidry concurred 
in the result but assigned reasons. Justices Knoll and Johnson concurred in part 
and dissented in part. Id. 
 142. Id.  
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award is based on the statutory interpretation of the conflict-of-laws 
articles, especially in light of Louisiana’s general policy against 
punitive damages.143 The Court began its legislative interpretation 
with article 3546 on punitive damages and analyzed each of the 
three requisite factors: (1) the place of the injurious conduct, (2) the 
place of the resulting injury, and (3) the place of the defendant’s 
domicile.144  
First, the Court affirmed that the resulting injuries occurred in 
Louisiana.145 Second, the Court analyzed CITGO’s domicile to 
determine whether CITGO should be domiciled in Louisiana for 
choice-of-law purposes or at its principle place of business in Texas 
or Oklahoma.146 Under the rules of statutory interpretation, “when 
two statutes apply to the same subject matter and their language 
cannot be harmonized, the language of the more specific statute 
applies . . . which . . . would be article 3548,” mandating that 
CITGO be domiciled in Louisiana in this case.147  
Instead of circumventing the application of article 3548 as the 
appellate court did,148 the Supreme Court harmonized the general 
choice-of-law provisions on domicile and the choice-of-law 
provisions on out-of-state domiciliaries incurring delictual liability 
in Louisiana.149 The Court found that while CITGO is a juridical 
person domiciled in Texas at its corporate headquarters under the 
general choice-of-law provisions, article 3548 requires that CITGO 
be considered a Louisiana domiciliary for the purpose of this 
delictual obligation, if appropriate under an interest analysis.150 The 
Court recognized that article 3548 on the domicile of out-of-state 
corporations includes the word “shall,” so the application of this 
article is mandatory when a juridical person incurs delictual liability 
in Louisiana.151  
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. at 312 (citing City of DeQuincy v. Henry, 62 So. 3d 43, 46 (La. 2011); 
In re Succession of Faget, 53 So. 3d 414, 420 (La. 2010)). The court recognized 
that “the Official Revision Comments are not the law,” unlike the appellate court, 
which heavily relied on the Official Revision Comments to affirm the damages 
award. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 312. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 351 So. 2d 1194, 1195 
(La. 1977). 
 144. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313. 
 145. Id. at 313−14.  
 146. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3518, 3548 (2013); supra Part II.B.2.  
 147. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313−14. 
 148. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the appellate court’s analysis of 
domicile. 
 149. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313−14.  
 150. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542 (2013). See supra note 73 for the article 
3542 policy considerations. 
 151. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 312, 314. 
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The Court also recognized that the appellate court failed to 
mention any factors to support CITGO being a domiciliary of 
Louisiana in its interest analysis152 and that the trial court  failed to 
discuss each state’s contacts in its interest analysis.153 The Supreme 
Court then properly performed an interest analysis in consideration 
of the specific facts of Arabie, including those contacts that favor 
CITGO as a Louisiana domiciliary.154  
In a case less than a year earlier than Arabie, the Supreme Court 
analyzed the domicile of a corporate defendant in a multistate tort 
conflict.155 To identify which of the involved state’s policies would 
be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied, the Court 
extracted a multifactor balancing test from the conflict-of-laws 
interest analysis.156 In its application to the facts of Arabie, the 
                                                                                                             
 152. Id. at 314. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations. 
The appellate court referenced the considerations in article 3542 as controlling 
domicile, in addition to the considerations under article 3548. See supra Part III.B. 
 153. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313, 316. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 
policy considerations.  
 154. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations. 
 155. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 315 (citing Wooley v. Lucksinger, 61 So. 3d 507, 
567 (La. 2011)). In Wooley, the Court chose to apply Texas law to award punitive 
damages in a delictual obligation arising between two Texas domiciliaries, one 
Louisiana domiciliary, and one Oklahoma domiciliary because the majority of the 
tortious conduct and the most severe harm occurred in Texas, although harm 
occurred in all three states. Wooley, 61 So. 3d at 567. 
 156. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313, 315−16. Article 3542, comment (a) instructs that 
this listing is merely illustrative and should be quantitatively evaluated. Id. at 316. 
The factors are extracted from article 3542 and include factors from article 3515 as 
well:  
(1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties; (2) their contacts to 
the events giving rise to the dispute, including the place and conduct and 
injury; (3) the domicile, habitual residence, or place of business of the 
parties; (4) the state in which the relationship between the parties was 
centered; (5) deterring wrongful conduct; and (6) repairing the 
consequences of injurious acts . . . (7) the relationship of each state to the 
parties and the dispute; and (8) the policies and needs of the interstate 
system, including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of 
the parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow 
from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.  
Id. Under the first factor—pertinent contacts—the Supreme Court found that the 
plaintiffs only had contact with Louisiana, which favored application of Louisiana 
law. Id. at 317. In evaluating the second factor—the state’s contacts giving rise to 
the dispute—the Court held that corporate decisions must outweigh local tortious 
conduct to be the place of injurious conduct in light of Louisiana’s legislative 
policy against punitive damages. Id. The Court pointed out that even if the third 10 
million gallon tank at the WWTU had been complete at the time of the refinery 
spill, the third tank could not have contained 21 million gallons of waste, along 
with eight additional perfunctory deficiencies at the Lake Charles refinery, which 
contributed to the spill. Id. at 317−18. For these reasons, the construction delay of 
the third tank did not cause the spill nor outweigh the allegedly tortious conduct at 
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Supreme Court explicitly noted that the plaintiffs only had contact 
with Louisiana and that CITGO anticipated defending a claim for 
injury that occurred in Louisiana under Louisiana law.157 From a 
policy standpoint, the court reasoned that an award of punitive 
damages under Texas or Oklahoma law was overshadowed by 
Louisiana’s legislative policy disfavoring punitive damages, unlike 
the appellate court’s denial of Louisiana’s policy against punitive 
damages.158 The compensatory damages awarded under Louisiana 
law repaired the consequences of injurious acts without the need for 
an award of punitive damages.159 For these reasons and others found 
through performing the multifactor interest analysis,160 the Supreme 
Court concluded that it was “appropriate” for CITGO to be domiciled 
in Louisiana as a juridical person.161 Therefore, CITGO could not be 
liable for punitive damages under article 3546 because its domicile 
was deemed to be in Louisiana and Louisiana was the place where the 
resulting injury occurred, meaning that at most, only one of the 
requisite three factors for an award of punitive damages—the place of 
the injurious conduct—could be satisfied.162 Thus, the Court affirmed 
                                                                                                             
 
the Lake Charles refinery. Id. at 318. The third factor—domicile—also favored 
Louisiana law because CITGO’s large Louisiana operation constitutes a place of 
business and all plaintiffs are habitual residents and domiciliaries of Louisiana. Id. 
The fourth factor—relationship between the parties—again supports Louisiana 
law because the spill in Louisiana is the only contact between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants. Id. The Court discounted the fifth factor—deterring wrongful 
conduct—by reasoning that the award of punitive damages is overshadowed by 
Louisiana’s legislative policy disfavoring punitive damages. Id. The compensatory 
damages awarded under Louisiana law satisfied the sixth factor—repairing the 
consequences of injurious acts—without the need for an award of punitive 
damages. Id. The seventh factor—the relationship between the states and parties—
favors Louisiana law because of the extent of conduct in Louisiana because 
plaintiffs reside in and are employed in Louisiana and because plaintiffs filed suit 
in Louisiana. Id. at 319. The eighth factor—policy interests—again favors 
Louisiana law because CITGO anticipated defending a claim for injury that 
occurred in Louisiana under Louisiana law; neither decisions made in Texas nor in 
Oklahoma were the primary cause of plaintiffs’ injury in Louisiana. Id. 
 157. Id. at 319. 
 158. Id. at 318. 
 159. Id.  
 160. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations. 
 161. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 319. 
 162. Id. The Court then analyzed article 3543 on conduct and safety. Id. at 320. 
It found that article 3543 should not apply to allow another state’s punitive 
damages law, contrary to what the lower courts decided. Id. The Court again 
applied the principles of statutory interpretation to determine that article 3546 on 
punitive damages should apply, rather than article 3543 on conduct and safety, 
because the more specific statute should apply when two statutes apply to the 
same subject matter and their language cannot be harmonized. Id. at 320 (citing 
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the place of injurious conduct to be Louisiana, negating any possible 
award of punitive damages under Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws 
provisions allowing such awards under the law of another state.163 
The Supreme Court also denied application of the choice-of-law 
allowance for exceptional cases as an “escape hatch” through which 
to award punitive damages in the alternative and to circumvent the 
application of the more specific conflict-of-laws provisions on 
punitive damages.164 Under the interest and policy analysis, it is not 
“clearly evident” that either Texas or Oklahoma would be more 
seriously impaired if its law were not applied.165  
In the end, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not permit an 
award of punitive damages because it found that the conflict-of-laws 
provisions did not allow for the application of the law of a foreign 
jurisdiction under the facts of Arabie.166 Although the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 
McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 65 So. 2d 1218, 1229 (La. 2011)). In the 
alternative, the Court reasoned that article 3543 would dictate the application of 
Louisiana law if it were to apply. Id. The first paragraph states that issues 
pertaining to standards of conduct are governed by the law of the state in which 
the injurious conduct occurred. Id. Louisiana law should apply because the most 
significant conduct—the refinery spill—occurred in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Id. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.  
 166. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 319, 324. The Court mainly relied upon article 3546, 
but it noted that articles 3543 and 3547 are also inapplicable in the alternative. Id. 
Justice Guidry concurred with the majority on the denial of punitive damages. Id. 
at 336 (Guidry, J., concurring). He recognized that punitive damages are not 
generally allowed under Louisiana law nor are they allowed under any of 
Louisiana’s statutory exceptions based on the facts of Arabie. Id. (citing Bellard v. 
American Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 667 (La. 2008); Gagnard v. Baldridge, 
612 So. 2d 732, 736 (La. 1993)). See supra Part II.A.2. However, he disagreed on 
the standard of review for an issue regarding choice-of-law. Id. Rather than 
applying a standard of manifest error, as the majority opinion did, Justice Guidry 
urged a standard of de novo review for choice-of-law determinations. Id. See 
Wooley v. Lucksinger, 61 So. 3d 507, 562−63 (La. 2011); Mihalopoulos v. 
Westwind Africa Ltd., 511 So. 2d 771, 775−76 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (“The law is 
well settled that a determination of choice of law by the trial court is reviewed by 
the appellate courts ‘de novo[.]’” (citing Diaz v. Humboldt, 722 F. 2d 1216 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). Nevertheless, Justice Guidry found the award of punitive damages 
under article 3546 improper due to legislative policy against punitive damages and 
jurisprudential concerns. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 336 (Guidry, J., concurring). He first 
recognized the refusal to award punitive damages as “a fundamental tenet of 
Louisiana law.” Id. at 337. Justice Guidry relied upon Ricard v. State, 390 So.2d 
882, 884 (La. 1980), for this proposition. Id. This policy was reinforced by the 
repeal of article 2315.3, specifically applicable to toxic tort cases. Arabie, 89 So. 
3d at 337−38 (Guidry, J., concurring). He then argued that “allow[ing] recovery 
under [the] facts [of Arabie], would infer a jurisprudential rule that corporations 
headquartered out-of-state can be held vicariously liable through the application of 
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Court reached the correct result in Arabie, it left a convoluted, 
multifactor interest analysis intact, which leaves room for legislative 
action to provide a more predictable choice-of-law analysis for 
multistate tort cases involving punitive damages.  
Further, three courts analyzed the facts of Arabie before 
reaching the correct conclusion on punitive damages. Although the 
Louisiana Supreme Court provided an interpretation of the articles 
governing choice-of-law in multistate tort conflicts—consistent with 
Louisiana’s legislative intent disfavoring the award of punitive 
damages—the analysis for future cases is uncertain. The 
inconsistency in the interpretation of the conflict-of-laws articles 
among Louisiana courts shows the need for legislative clarification 
in this area of law to ensure that the code articles are properly 
applied in future cases.  
Arabie supports the implementation of a specific statutory basis 
for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to provide certainty in 
future litigation involving corporations conducting business across 
multiple jurisdictions so that courts reach consistent results in 
multistate tort conflicts and litigation does not require multiple, 
time-consuming appeals.  
IV. THE DOOR AJAR: BEWARE OF GREEKS BEARING GIFTS 
The Louisiana Supreme Court closed the door to punitive 
damages in Arabie, but the door has been left ajar for future 
plaintiffs to push the limits of the conflict-of-laws articles provided 
in the Louisiana Civil Code. The Court reached the correct result in 
one case but only increased a plaintiff’s burden of using article 3546 
for an award of punitive damages in future cases. Arabie did not, 
however, completely close the door to punitive damages by any 
means. Through conflicting codal interpretation and clashes in the 
                                                                                                             
 
another forum’s laws for its Louisiana employees’ tortious acts absent evidence of 
management’s participation, consent or control.” Id. Justices Knoll and Johnson 
concurred with the majority in part but dissented from the majority opinion on the 
reversal of punitive damages. Id. at 324. (Knoll, J., dissenting). Justice Knoll 
concurred with the majority’s affirmation of compensatory damages. Id. In Justice 
Knoll’s dissent, she agreed with the lower courts and reasoned that CITGO was 
domiciled outside of Louisiana and the injurious conduct occurred outside of 
Louisiana, therefore satisfying an award of punitive damages by meeting two of 
article 3546’s requirements. Id. Interestingly, she pointed out that the choice-of-
law provisions in the Code do not create a presumption that Louisiana law should 
apply to suits filed in Louisiana. Id. Regardless of whether there is a presumption 
or not, article 3548 and the interpretation of the majority clearly state that CITGO 
should be domiciled in Louisiana as a juridical person, which undercuts Justice 
Knoll’s conclusion on domicile and the award of punitive damages. 
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choice-of-law provisions, there is still an opportunity for courts to 
reach different results in future litigation, and courts have already 
begun to reach inconsistent results less than a year after the Arabie 
decision. 
A. The Continuing Challenge: Evans v. TIN, Inc. 
Within a month of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
Arabie, claimants showed that there may still be room to use the 
Louisiana Civil Code articles on conflict of laws to permit awards of 
punitive damages, contrary to legislative intent. In Evans v. TIN, 
Inc.,167 plaintiffs brought suit in federal court under an eerily similar 
fact pattern to that in Arabie. The dispute arose after TIN’s paper 
mill and waste treatment facility in Bogalusa, Louisiana, discharged 
contaminants into the Pearl River, which allegedly caused injury to 
property owners, businesses, and individuals.168 Plaintiffs sought 
punitive damages under Texas law against TIN for the resulting 
injury that occurred in Louisiana under the Louisiana conflict-of-
laws articles.169 The plaintiffs argued that two of the requisite three 
article 3546 factors authorizing an award for punitive damages 
under the law of another state were satisfied: (1) that decisions at 
corporate headquarters in Texas constituted the injurious conduct, 
rather than conduct at the Louisiana paper mill; and (2) that the 
defendant should be domiciled at its principal place of business in 
Texas, rather than in Louisiana where the out-of-state corporation 
conducted business and incurred the delictual liability.170  
In evaluating the defendant’s motion to dismiss the punitive 
damages claims, the Evans court extensively analyzed the punitive 
damages claims under article 3546 and the corresponding choice-of-
law articles, citing Arabie throughout its analysis.171 The parties did 
not dispute that the place of the resulting injury was Louisiana.172 As 
for the injurious conduct, the plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged that 
corporate-level decisions occurring in Texas outweighed any 
tortious activity that occurred locally.”173 The court then applied the 
                                                                                                             
 167. Evans v. TIN, Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–2348, 
11–2351, 11–2417, 11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–3048, 
11–3049, 12–18, 11–3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012). 
 168. Id. at *1. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. The plaintiffs attempted to employ federal admiralty law as well, 
which failed and resulted in dismissal of their punitive damages claims under that 
cause of action. Id. at *3−4. 
 171. Id. at *5−12. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at *7. 
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multifactor interest test, as the Louisiana Supreme Court had done in 
Arabie,174 to conclude that Texas law may be more seriously 
impaired in the matter, which supported treating TIN as a Texas 
domiciliary.175 Therefore, the district court concluded that it was too 
soon to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages because 
(1) the place of the injurious conduct and (2) the place of the 
defendant’s domicile should be in Texas, which allows an award of 
punitive damages.176  
Evans proves not only that parties are already trying to 
circumvent the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Arabie but 
also that parties may use trial and error to file the identical claim in 
federal court that Arabie found to be unsuccessful in state court.177 
This sets a dangerous precedent and reopens the door to the Trojan 
Horse of punitive damages under Louisiana’s choice-of-law 
provisions, which the Legislature needs to close. 
B. Slaying the Trojan Horse: A Legislative Solution to the 
Inconsistency in Codal Interpretation 
The Legislature needs to amend the conflict-of-laws articles to 
clarify the analysis for multistate torts involving punitive damages. 
In order to close the codal loopholes exposed in the Arabie litigation 
and left open in the Evans litigation, the Legislature should focus on 
the choice-of-law provisions governing the place of the injurious 
conduct and the place of the defendant’s domicile, giving attention 
to how plaintiffs can circumvent the current provisions. 
1. Striking the “Injurious Conduct” from Article 3546 
All three courts in Arabie agreed that the resulting injury 
occurred in Louisiana but disagreed as to where the injurious 
conduct occurred.178 There is an odd disconnect in the appellate 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at *12. 
 176. Id. 
 177. “The lead case in this consolidated proceeding was the first of 33 cases 
filed in various federal and state courts.” Evans v. TIN, Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–
2068; 11–2069; 11–2182; 11–2348; 11–2351; 11–2417; 11–2949; 11–2985; 11–
2987; 11–3018; 11–3021; 11–3048; 11–3049; 12–18; 11–3050; 12–2042; 12–
2424; 12–2815; 12–2819; 12–2824; 12–2825; 12–236, 2013 WL 4501061 (E.D. 
La. Aug. 21, 2013). The parties engaged in settlement negotiations under the 
supervision of a mediator, “and TIN’s insurance carriers reached an agreement to 
resolve plaintiff’s claims against” them. Id. “The class action settlement resolved 
all claims related to the incident, except for certain ‘later-manifested bodily injury’ 
claims.” Id.  
 178. See supra Part III. 
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court’s conclusory paragraph where the court said that “but for the 
release in 2006, the damages to the plaintiffs would not have 
occurred.”179 The court is admitting to “but for” causation of the 
plaintiffs’ injuries and contradicting its entire conflict-of-laws 
analysis, which argued that the injurious conduct occurred out of 
state at headquarters, rather than at the refinery in Louisiana or at 
both locations.180 This concession undermines the court’s own 
argument and is evidence of judicial unrest in the interpretation of 
article 3546’s consideration of injurious conduct when analyzing a 
claim for punitive damages in a choice-of-law situation. 
The appellate court also contradicted itself by reaffirming that 
the resulting injury occurred in Louisiana but stating that the 
resulting injury was caused by injurious conduct at the Louisiana 
refinery.181 If the appellate court’s determination that malfunctions 
at the Louisiana refinery were the only cause of the refinery spill is 
taken as true, the appellate court’s finding on this issue is 
incongruent with the plaintiffs’ argument and the appellate court’s 
ultimate determination that the injurious conduct occurred through 
decision-making at CITGO’s corporate headquarters in Oklahoma 
and Texas. The court’s finding on the injurious conduct should also 
pretermit the punitive damages discussion altogether. If the site of 
the injurious conduct is in fact at the refinery in Louisiana, then 
there would be no opportunity for punitive damages through 
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions because it would be 
impossible to meet two of article 3546’s three requirements for the 
award of punitive damages, i.e., (1) the place of the resulting injury, 
(2) the place of the injurious conduct, or (3) the place of the 
defendant’s domicile.182 
The Evans court repeated the same contradiction as the lower 
courts in Arabie by reasoning that corporate headquarters decisions 
in Texas may be the site of the injurious conduct under article 3546, 
although the resulting injuries occurred in Louisiana, even after the 
Louisiana Supreme Court corrected the same reasoning under the 
facts in Arabie.183 There is clear confusion, which requires a 
legislative remedy, when three courts have made the same mistake 
in the article 3546 analysis of injurious conduct.  
                                                                                                             
 179. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 556−57 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). This statement was in the context of stating causation occurred in “both 
states,” presumably referring to Texas and Oklahoma. Id. 
 180. Id. See supra Part III.B. 
 181. See supra Part III.B. 
 182. The Louisiana Supreme Court properly reached this determination and 
corrected the flaw in the lower courts’ reasoning in the article 3546 analyses. See 
supra Part III.C. 
 183. See supra Part IV.A. 
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The most logical solution would be to limit article 3546 by 
excluding the consideration of injurious conduct because it can be 
such a tenuous concept along an indefinite chain of causation. A 
delictual action resulting from years of allegedly injurious conduct 
lends itself to manipulation of this requirement.184 The injurious 
conduct consideration must be stricken from article 3546 to provide 
a more predictable basis for awarding punitive damages based on 
where the resulting injury occurred and the place of the defendant’s 
domicile. Article 3546 should be amended to read as follows: 
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this 
state unless authorized: 
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct 
occurred and by either the law of the state where the 
resulting injury occurred or the law of the place where 
the person whose conduct caused the injury was 
domiciled; or 
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and 
by the law of the state where the person whose conduct 
caused the injury was domiciled.185  
This revision would remedy the attenuation in the injurious 
conduct analysis and prevent the uncertainty in the article 3546 
analysis. The analysis currently involves three factors yet only 
requires two to be met for an award of punitive damages. Instead of 
arguing the weight of corporate headquarters’ decisions made out of 
state against the weight of delictual conduct occurring in Louisiana, 
the court would only consider two factors: the place of the resulting 
injury and the place of the defendant’s domicile, both of which are 
subject to less ambiguity. Both factors would be required for an 
award of punitive damages under another state’s law, instead of the 
three alternative factors that, as the article is currently written, are 
subject to manipulation. By striking consideration of the injurious 
                                                                                                             
 184. See supra Part III.B. 
 185. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3546 (2013) (alteration to original). An example of a 
defendant’s domicile in a jurisdiction allowing punitive damages that would meet 
the revised requirement would be a company transacting unrelated business in 
Louisiana but headquartered outside of Louisiana, which would evade jurisdiction 
under the proposed version of article 3548. See infra Part IV.B.2. Additionally, a 
company transacting business in Louisiana and incurring delictual liability in 
Louisiana but headquartered elsewhere, thus evading jurisdiction under the current 
version of article 3548, might meet this revised domicile requirement. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 3548 (2013). An example of a the resulting injury in a jurisdiction 
allowing punitive damages that would meet the revised requirement would be a 
long term disease, such as asbestos, or perhaps a legacy lawsuit for environmental 
damages in another jurisdiction, which were caused by a company transacting 
business in multiple jurisdictions.  
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conduct from article 3546, the analysis of future multistate tort cases 
would be more predictable on the basis of two clear factors. 
2. Striking the “Interest Analysis” from Article 3548 
The Arabie courts also had various interpretations of the articles 
governing the domicile of parties to multistate tort litigation and 
ultimately decided that the two codal provisions could be 
harmonized to declare CITGO a Louisiana domiciliary.186 CITGO’s 
admission of fault recognized the situs of the injurious conduct to be 
at the location of the refinery spill in Louisiana, which proved that 
CITGO intended to be domiciled in Louisiana as a juridical person 
doing business in Louisiana.187 Furthermore, CITGO’s admission of 
fault specified responsibility for “compensatory damages,” with no 
mention of punitive damages.188 This also shows that CITGO 
understood that it was subject to the law of Louisiana, which did not 
permit the award of punitive damages in such a case. As dictated by 
the current codal provisions and the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
Arabie, CITGO’s expectation to be domiciled in Louisiana as a 
corporation conducting business in Louisiana and incurring delictual 
liability in Louisiana seems to be the correct result.  
Even after Arabie, the Evans court recognized that the choice-
of-law domicile provisions could be harmonized. However, the 
Evans court still domiciled the defendant–corporation at its principal 
place of business in Texas under the Arabie multifactor interest 
analysis, rather than in Louisiana where it conducted business and 
incurred delictual liability.189 The appellate court in the Arabie 
litigation also relied heavily on the multifactor interest analysis to 
avoid domiciling CITGO in Louisiana where it conducted business 
and incurred delictual liability, which shows there is a recurring 
problem involving the domicile provisions in a multistate tort 
conflict.190  
                                                                                                             
 186. See supra Part III.C. 
 187. See supra Part III.A. 
 188. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 534 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 189. See supra Part IV.A. 
 190. The appellate court became so preoccupied with analyzing comments to 
the code articles that it never came to a true conclusion on the second prong of the 
article 3542 interest analysis, much less the application of article 3542 itself. The 
appellate court bypassed the remaining factors to be considered under the pertinent 
contacts prong of article 3542: “the events giving rise to the dispute, including the 
place of conduct and injury, the domicile, habitual residence, or place of business 
of the parties, and the state in which the relationship, if any, between the parties 
was centered.” Art. 3546. The court exhausted the events giving rise to the dispute 
but did not address how many of those events actually occurred in Lake Charles, 
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Under the current choice-of-law provisions on delictual liability, 
article 3548 requires that a corporation conducting business in 
Louisiana be domiciled in state with the word “shall.”191 This does 
not allow the court to circumvent this requirement, but nonetheless, 
courts are relying upon an interest analysis,192 from which the 
Louisiana Supreme Court created a multifactor test, to circumvent 
the application of article 3548. As article 3548 currently reads, a 
court may avoid declaring an out-of-state tortfeasor as a Louisiana 
domiciliary if it finds that another state’s interests would be more 
seriously impaired by considering the corporation a Louisiana 
domiciliary.  
The Legislature must prevent judicial reliance on the multifactor 
interest analysis to circumvent the codal provisions governing 
domicile. To preclude courts from meeting the domicile requirement 
of article 3546 on punitive damages and from awarding punitive 
damages by domiciling defendants outside of Louisiana, article 
3548 should be redacted to strike the interest analysis as a codal 
circumvention and mandate that all tortfeasors be domiciled in 
Louisiana when a tortfeasor conducted business in Louisiana and 
                                                                                                             
 
which could also influence the pertinent contacts analysis. The court analyzed the 
place of conduct as headquarters but explicitly conceded that the place of injury 
was Lake Charles. The Third Circuit determined that CITGO was domiciled at its 
headquarters, but this is debatable under a pertinent contacts analysis. The court 
failed to note that CITGO was a habitual resident of Louisiana at the situs of its 
place of business—the Lake Charles refinery. Most importantly, the appellate 
court never discussed the relationships of each state to the parties and the dispute, 
as required by the first prong of article 3515. This weighs most heavily in 
CITGO’s favor because the plaintiffs only had a relationship with CITGO in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana. They were employed in Louisiana, worked in Louisiana, and 
were injured by CITGO in Louisiana. CITGO headquarters in Texas never had 
any contact with these plaintiffs prior to this litigation. The court never discussed 
the adverse consequences of subjecting CITGO to the law of more than one state 
under the second prong of article 3515. Article 3543, comment (f), which was 
referenced in the opinion but is not even the relevant article, mentioned that “there 
is nothing unfair about subjecting a tortfeasor to the law of the state in which he 
acted. Having violated the standards of conduct of that state, he should bear the 
consequences of such violation and should not be allowed to invoke the lower 
standards of another state.” Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 555 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 
3543 cmt. f. (2013)). Again, this comment can be viewed in CITGO’s favor. First, 
they acted in both Texas and Louisiana. Second, an award of greater damages 
should not be characterized as a “higher standard of conduct.” To make a final 
interpretation under the article 3542 interest analysis, as the appellate court neither 
clarified its reasoning nor made a final conclusion until it simply stated that it 
applied, it would be very reasonable to believe both the pertinent contacts and 
policy considerations would favor the application of Louisiana law. Id. at 556. 
 191. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3548 (2013). 
 192. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations. 
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incurred delictual liability in Louisiana. Article 3548 should be 
amended to read as follows: 
For the purposes of this Title, and provided it is appropriate 
under the principles of Article 3542, a juridical person that is 
domiciled outside of this state, but which transacts business 
in this state and incurs a delictual or quasi-delictual 
obligation arising from activity within this state, shall be 
treated as a domiciliary of this state.193 
If the Legislature makes this amendment, two goals would be 
met: reinforcement of legislative intent and predictability. First, 
courts would be bound to domicile out-of-state corporations in 
Louisiana if they meet the two codal requirements: (1) conducting 
business in Louisiana and (2) incurring a delictual liability in 
Louisiana. Article 3458 is weak as it currently reads. Presently, 
courts may easily circumvent article 3548 through an unpredictable 
multifactor interest analysis. The Legislature promulgated article 
3548 as a domicile provision exclusive to multistate torts, in 
addition to the general conflict-of-laws domicile provision; if the 
Legislature’s true intent was to subject out-of-state tortfeasors to 
Louisiana domicile as a means to limit the award of punitive 
damages, the consideration of “the principles of Article 3542” 
should be stricken from this article to remove this loophole. Second, 
amending article 3548 would make a defendant in a multistate tort 
suit arising from activity in Louisiana almost certainly a Louisiana 
domiciliary, aiding predictability. Legislative intent against punitive 
damages and predictability are core tenets of Louisiana’s choice-of-
law codification, and the Legislature should amend article 3458 to 
reflect this. 
3. Repealing the “Escape Hatch” Under Article 3547 
The codal allowance for exceptional cases is inconsistent with 
the balance of the conflict-of-laws provisions on multistate torts. 
The Civil Code provides seven articles specific to choice-of-law for 
delictual obligations.194 Yet, article 3547 allows the court to 
circumvent all of these articles to apply the law of another state if it 
is “clearly evident . . . that the policies of another state would be 
more seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular 
issue.”195 This can occur if “from the totality of the circumstances of 
                                                                                                             
 193. Art. 3548 (alteration to original). 
 194. See id. arts. 3542−3548. 
 195. Art. 3547. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations. 
Article 3547 has its critics. See Russel J. Weintraub, The Contribution of 
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an exceptional case,”196 the court reaches that conclusion. Both the 
trial court and the appellate court in Arabie refrained from applying 
article 3547 to circumvent the more explicit conflict-of-laws articles 
governing multistate torts but recognized it as a fallback provision 
permitting the award of punitive damages.197 Only the Supreme 
Court denied the application of the “escape hatch” as an alternative 
method to allow an award of punitive damages under Texas law.198 
If the policy analysis dictated by the conflicts codification and 
Louisiana’s policy against punitive damages are to be taken 
seriously, the Legislature should consider repealing the article 3547 
“escape hatch” to provide greater clarity in the conflict-of-laws 
articles. As noted by the original opponents of the conflicts 
codification, specific policies espoused by the Louisiana Legislature, 
like the legislative policy against punitive damages, need to be 
safeguarded against circumvention. Article 3547 may be an aid to 
the interjection of the perfect Trojan Horse for importing punitive 
damages into Louisiana against Louisiana’s legislative policy. 
Therefore, article 3547 should be repealed if Louisiana is serious 
about restricting awards of punitive damages. Alternatively, the 
article could be amended to exclude article 3546 on punitive 
damages and read as follows: 
The law applicable under Articles 3543−35456 shall not 
apply if, from the totality of the circumstances of an 
exceptional case, it is clearly evident under the principles of 
Article 3542, that the policies of another state would be 
more seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the 
particular issue. In such event, the law of the other state shall 
apply.199 
The legislative proposal to either repeal article 3547 or to amend 
article 3547 would provide a sufficient solution to prevent courts 
from using this “escape hatch” as a loophole to award punitive 
damages under another state’s law, even if such an award would not 
be permissible under the codal provisions. 
                                                                                                             
 
Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable and Just: An 
Appreciation and Critique, 38 AM. J. COMP. LAW 431, 473 (1990). 
 196. Art. 3547. 
 197. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 556 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 198. The Evans court did not rely upon the article 3547 escape hatch as a 
primary authorization for punitive damages or as an alternative. See supra Part 
IV.A. 
 199. Art. 3547. 
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If the Legislature makes these proposed amendments to the 
conflict-of-laws provisions on delictual liability to remedy the 
current uncertainty in the punitive damages analysis, future litigants 
would benefit from the clarity and predictability provided by the 
amendments, and the judiciary would be insulated from unnecessary 
litigation regarding the meaning of the choice-of-law articles and the 
unpredictable multifactor interest analysis. 
C. Lingering Inside the Gates: Policy Concerns from Punitive 
Damages 
In addition to showing the need for legislative remedies to 
correct improper statutory interpretation, Arabie also exposed 
overarching policy concerns in the conflicts codification, 
specifically forum selection and corporate exposure in relation to 
punitive damages claims in multistate torts. Legislative proposals 
could effectively rectify these concerns. 
1. Jurisdiction Jumping: Federal Versus State Court 
An oddity from the very beginning of the Arabie litigation is that 
the plaintiffs chose to file suit in Louisiana state court, even though 
the plaintiffs continually insisted that the situs of the injurious 
conduct was at the defendant’s headquarters and that CITGO should 
be domiciled at its headquarters in Texas or Oklahoma. Even though 
they had filed suit in state court, the plaintiffs fervently fought for an 
award of punitive damages, which is disfavored under Louisiana 
law. The plaintiffs could have easily filed suit in federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction, a forum in which their path to punitive 
damages might have been easier.200 Alternatively, the application of 
Texas law in a federal suit would have allowed the award of 
punitive damages.201  
The reasons that the plaintiffs chose to file suit in Louisiana state 
court are clear: the traditional plaintiff preference for state courts 
and the avoidance of a jury trial. This jurisdictional jump set the 
stage for the entire debate on the place of the defendant’s domicile 
and the place of injurious conduct, and it supports the need for 
                                                                                                             
 200. It is important to note that a federal court is bound to apply the substantive 
law of the state in which the federal action was brought. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938). But, filing suit in federal court would arguably yield an easier 
policy argument for the award of punitive damages. A federal judge might have a 
broader approach to the Louisiana state policy on punitive damages, rather than a 
Louisiana state judge who is more in tune with the policy of the state. 
 201. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 2008). 
2013] COMMENT 363 
 
 
 
amendments to the conflict-of-laws provisions governing punitive 
damages.  
a. The Traditional Plaintiff Preference for State Courts 
Certain factors sometimes steer plaintiffs away from federal 
courts, “such as greater federal judicial supervision, a greater 
geographical reach of federal jury pools leading to perhaps more 
pro-defense panels, and a perceived greater federal enthusiasm for 
dismissing cases on summary judgment.”202 The Arabie plaintiffs’ 
manipulation of these preconceived notions about federal courts 
ultimately backfired. The plaintiffs filed suit in state court, although 
there was complete diversity between the Louisiana plaintiffs and 
CITGO under the plaintiffs’ argument that CITGO should be 
domiciled at its headquarters in Texas or Oklahoma. The plaintiffs 
prevented removal by declaring damages for each plaintiff under the 
requisite amount for a federal diversity action.203 Ironically, the 
plaintiffs lost their claim for punitive damages by failing to file in 
federal court under Texas law in order to take advantage of Texas’s 
punitive damages provisions.204 If the codal provisions governing 
domicile in multistate tort cases are amended to strictly treat out-of-
state corporations doing business in Louisiana and incurring 
delictual liability in Louisiana as Louisiana domiciliaries, the 
defendant–corporation’s domicile would clearly be Louisiana, 
which would effectively minimize the opportunity for forum 
shopping in claims subject to diversity jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                             
 202. Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 (internal citations omitted).  
 203. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 generally allows defendants to remove a case originally 
filed in state court to federal court. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 n.29. 
 204. “[E]ven a state with a constitutional prohibition on punitive damages must 
recognize without question a judgment for punitive damages from another state” 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. Borchers, supra note 
23, at 530−31. Texas substantive law applies a “most significant relationship 
approach” to conflict of laws, which balances the relative interest of each state in 
having its own law applied based on the factors in the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, which include: the needs of the interstate and international 
systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested 
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular 
issue; the protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the 
particular field of law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and the 
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Am. Home 
Assur. Co. v. Safway Steel Products Co., Inc., A Div. of Figgie Intern., Inc., 743 
S.W.2d 693, 696−97 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). This is an inherently fact sensitive analysis, 
however, the policies of the forum may favor the application of Texas law to the 
facts of Arabie in either a Texas forum or if Texas substantive law were applied in 
a federal court. 
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b. The Avoidance of a Jury Trial  
Another irony is the Arabie plaintiffs’ strategy of filing suit in 
Louisiana state court to avoid a jury trial. Under Louisiana law, the 
threshold for a jury trial in a civil suit is an individual cause of 
action worth a minimum of $50,000.205 The appellate court’s 
opinion in Arabie specifically stated that “no plaintiff received a 
total award exceeding $50,000.00 due to the jurisdictional limits for 
a bench trial.”206 A sum in excess of $75,000 is the minimum 
amount in controversy required to file a federal diversity action,207 
which also happens to be greater than the amount claimed by the 
Arabie plaintiffs. This gave the plaintiffs two reasons to keep their 
claims under these requisite amounts: (1) to avoid a jury trial and (2) 
to avoid removal to federal court.208 
Punitive damages were key to the Arabie plaintiffs’ case. It was 
a calculated risk to exercise Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions 
on punitive damages, but it was arguably less risky than yielding to 
Texas law on the issue.  
                                                                                                             
 205. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1732 (2013). This threshold amount cannot 
be met in the aggregate and is exclusive of interest and costs. Id. A bench trial is 
held in claims for any lesser amount. See id. In the 2012 legislative session, House 
Bill 343 was proposed to lower the cap for civil jury trials from $50,000 to 
$15,000 in tort cases tried in Louisiana state courts, with a focus on personal 
injury cases. Bill Barrow, House Committee Rejects Lowering Threshold for Jury 
Trials in Lawsuits, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 2, 2012, http://www.nola.com 
/politics/index.ssf/2012/04/house_committee_rejects_loweri.html. 
 206. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 557 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). Despite failed efforts of legislative adjustment, Louisiana has the highest 
national threshold for a civil jury trial. Louisiana Lawsuit Abuse Watch published 
a report asserting that Louisiana’s threshold for civil jury trials is in fact twenty-
eight times the national average of $1,742.40. Press Release, Louisiana Lawsuit 
Abuse Watch, Study Finds LA Jury Trial Threshold More Than 28 Times 
National Average (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.llaw.org/release 
_030912.html. Even the maximum threshold is $35,000 less than Louisiana’s 
threshold. REDUCING ACCESS TO THE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF LOUISIANA’S JURY 
TRIAL THRESHOLD, A RESEARCH REPORT BY LOUISIANA LAWSUIT ABUSE WATCH 
4 (2012), available at http://www.llaw.org/docs/ReducingAccesstotheCourts 
_FINAL.pdf. 
 207. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 208. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. 2007-2738, 2009 WL 
7170890 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2009) (order for an itemization of plaintiffs’ 
damages). 
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2. The Substantive and Procedural Clash: Consequences of 
Codal Silence 
In addition to forum considerations, there are also policy 
concerns over the differences in state substantive and procedural law 
that are not always resolved in a choice-of-law analysis under 
Louisiana’s codal framework. Although courts are bound to follow 
the procedural law of the forum state, the procedural law may be at 
odds with another state’s substantive law, especially in multistate 
tort cases. The Arabie litigation revealed substantive and procedural 
issues involving the classification of punitive damages and the 
requisite burden of proof in a punitive damages claim under 
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions. 
a. The Classification of the Availability of Punitive Damages 
Courts nationwide are split on whether the classification of 
punitive damages should be a substantive or procedural issue. Some 
courts classify the availability of punitive damages as a procedural 
issue and apply the law of the forum, whereas other courts classify 
punitive damages as a substantive tort issue.209 The substantive 
classification leads to the consideration of the following factors both 
singly and jointly: the place of the injurious conduct, the situs of the 
plaintiff’s injury, and the defendant’s domicile or principal place of 
business.210 These factors mirror those embodied in the Louisiana 
Civil Code articles, namely the factors of article 3546 on punitive 
damages in a multistate tort conflict.211 This connection lends itself 
to the inference that Louisiana courts view the issue of punitive 
damages as a substantive issue, therefore requiring consideration of 
the article 3546 factors. 
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, which limited the 
ratio of compensatory and punitive damages,212 could be viewed as 
questioning the constitutionality of states imposing punitive 
damages “extraterritorially” in states other than where the defendant 
acted.213 This idea drawn from State Farm supports weighing the 
place of the injurious conduct as the foremost factor under a 
                                                                                                             
 209. Borchers, supra note 23, at 531. 
 210. Id. at 530−31. 
 211. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3546 (2013). 
 212. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); 
Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 (citing Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004)). 
 213. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 (citing Campbell, 98 P.3d 409). 
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substantive analysis of punitive damages.214 The conflict of laws 
would then be resolved by applying the law of the forum where the 
injurious conduct occurred. Once again, the consideration of the 
classification of punitive damages as substantive or procedural 
circles back to the argument in Arabie over whether the place of the 
injurious conduct was at corporate headquarters or at the refinery in 
Louisiana.  
However, the consideration of the place of the injurious conduct 
in a substantive analysis of punitive damages creates a loophole, 
allowing manipulation of where the injurious conduct occurred, 
which is why it might be more predictable to consider the place of 
the resulting injury instead. This provides further support for an 
amendment to the conflict-of-laws provisions to strike the 
consideration of the place of the injurious conduct and to clarify the 
analysis, especially because Louisiana law seems to classify punitive 
damages as a substantive issue by requiring consideration of these 
factors. The classification of the availability of punitive damages 
also raises an issue over the classification of the necessity of a jury 
trial in a claim for punitive damages, which may be substantive in 
some states, yet procedural in others.  
b. The Classification of the Necessity of a Jury Trial 
In a claim for punitive damages under Texas law, there must be 
a unanimous jury on the questions of liability for and the amount of 
punitive damages.215 This requirement alone raises a procedural 
dilemma in applying Texas substantive law on punitive damages 
under Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions in a civil case brought 
in Louisiana state court. Louisiana procedural law does not provide 
for a jury trial in civil claims worth less than $50,000, yet Louisiana 
procedural law governs the award of damages in a Louisiana 
forum.216 For this reason, it is impossible to return a unanimous jury 
verdict on punitive damages without asserting a claim for 
Louisiana’s requisite threshold amount. Thus, the lower court 
decisions in Arabie could not have possibly applied Texas 
substantive law on punitive damages because the plaintiffs each 
asserted claims for less than $50,000. Arguably, the district court 
judge and the appellate court judge abused their discretion in 
awarding punitive damages under Texas law without a unanimous 
jury verdict because such an award conflicts with the black-letter 
law. This is the essence of a substantive and procedural clash to 
                                                                                                             
 214. See id. 
 215. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003(d) (West 2008). 
 216. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1732 (2013). 
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which the current Louisiana conflict-of-laws articles open the door 
by allowing the application of potentially incompatible substantive 
law under Louisiana procedural provisions. Because of this conflict, 
the choice-of-law articles should be amended to further restrict the 
award of punitive damages under the law of other states in an effort 
to minimize this substantive and procedural clash in future cases. 
c. The Classification of the Standard of Proof 
Another substantive versus procedural debate arises over how 
states classify the standard of proof for an award of punitive 
damages. For instance, some states might have a bifurcated 
approach of applying the law of the forum to the standard of proof 
as a procedural issue but applying another state’s law to the standard 
of conduct for the same issue.217 This issue also rose to the forefront 
in the Arabie litigation because Louisiana law, which was the law of 
the forum, statutorily dictates the requisite standard of liability for 
each codal exception allowing punitive damages, which is a 
substantive determination based on the tort at issue, but Louisiana 
law is silent on the standard of proof for punitive damages in 
conflict-of-laws situations. Texas law, on the other hand, allows for 
three standards of proof to be considered in the award of punitive 
damages, which is a procedural determination. This differentiation 
in the standard of proof is yet another weak point in the Louisiana 
conflict-of-laws provisions because the provisions do not clearly 
reconcile standard of proof issues and open the door to another 
state’s procedural law. While amending the codal provisions to 
restrict the award of punitive damages under another state’s law may 
minimize the issue, it might also be advisable to amend the choice-
of-law provisions on punitive damages to explicitly require a 
heightened standard of proof, as is required for Louisiana’s statutory 
exceptions for punitive damages, as a procedural law of the forum, 
which would simultaneously minimize corporate exposure.  
3. Corporate Exposure: The Result of Multijurisdictional 
Business Transactions 
Yet another policy concern raised in Arabie is the exposure that 
corporate defendants face in choosing to conduct business in 
Louisiana. In Arabie, Justice Knoll alone took note of this very real 
economic concern embedded within the conflict-of-laws 
provisions.218 The Projet drafters obviously recognized this as a 
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 218. See supra Part III.C. 
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valid point because they provided specific provisions to govern the 
domicile of juridical persons incurring delictual liability while 
conducting business in Louisiana.219 This policy concern parallels 
the other policy concerns embedded throughout the choice-of-law 
rules, such as the consideration of pertinent contacts and the situs of 
the injurious conduct.  
The domicile provisions specific to multistate tort cases should 
be viewed as specifically insulating corporations seeking to do 
business in Louisiana by allowing them to predict the applicable law 
and conduct business accordingly.220 It would certainly be unfair 
from a policy standpoint to have subjected CITGO to Texas law on 
punitive damages when it clearly anticipated liability for tortious 
conduct to be addressed under Louisiana law, as the conflict-of-laws 
provisions dictate. As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted, the 
plaintiffs were adequately compensated with an award of 
compensatory damages, without the need for an award of punitive 
damages.221 Application of specific domicile provisions in such 
situations is also supported by the policy concern of subjecting 
corporate defendants to inconsistent laws of multiple forums, which 
the Projet drafters noted as a core reason for the conflicts 
codification. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court was correct in 
its statutory interpretation of CITGO’s domicile.222 As such, the 
codal domicile provisions should be amended to strike policy 
considerations and the multifactor interest analysis, as used in 
Arabie, as a loophole to domicile corporate defendants out of state. 
4. Louisiana’s Purported Policy Against Punitive Damages: The 
Contradiction and the Clarification 
Perhaps the most important policy concern—made apparent by 
the Arabie litigation—is Louisiana’s purported policy against 
punitive damages. One could argue, as the lower courts and the 
plaintiffs did in Arabie, that Louisiana has no true policy against the 
award of punitive damages.223 While scholars may debate the issue, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly affirmed the policy and 
maintained this civil law tradition in its ultimate decision in 
Arabie.224 
                                                                                                             
 219. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 220. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 221. See supra Part III.C. 
 222. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3518, 3548 (2013). 
 223. See supra Parts III.A, B. 
 224. In Arabie, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “the legislature has 
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that punitive damages are only authorized in particular situations shows that the 
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Aside from those specific, statutorily excepted awards of 
punitive damages, perhaps the most stunning contradiction in both 
the statutory exceptions and the current conflict-of-laws articles is 
that there is no cap on the award of punitive damages in 
Louisiana.225 This is against the very essence of the idea that 
Louisiana has a strict policy against punitive damages, if the 
instances in which they are allowed by statutory exception allow 
them without limit. 
Furthermore, the common law predecessor to this notion and 
Louisiana’s common law neighbors leave punitive damages to the 
discretion of a jury. Again, Louisiana’s limitation on jury trials 
resurfaces as a procedural flaw in leaving the limitless award of 
punitive damages to only a judge’s discretion in many cases that 
would require a jury trial under the substantive law of other 
jurisdictions from which the punitive damages provisions are 
imported in a choice-of-law situation. Consequently, this leaves the 
award to a judge with little experience in awarding punitive 
damages at all, seeing as it is not the normal type of damages 
awarded in Louisiana. 
In Arabie, the court of appeal blatantly denied Louisiana’s 
policy against punitive damages.226 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
correctly refuted the appellate court on this assertion and 
jurisprudentially affirmed the Legislature’s longstanding intent of 
restricting punitive damages in Louisiana, as it did more than 100 
years before in Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana.227 There is clear 
authority for Louisiana’s longstanding policy against the award of 
punitive damages in the limited statutory exceptions for punitive 
damages and the recent repeal of article 2315.3. The lower courts’ 
analyses in Arabie show how easy it could be to grant an award of 
punitive damages by importing foreign law under Louisiana’s 
current conflict-of-laws provisions. In fact, more cases following the 
Arabie plaintiffs’ lead have arisen since this initial challenge under 
the choice-of-law provisions. The legislative intent restricting 
punitive damages, along with policy concerns, should prevent 
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plaintiffs from circumventing Louisiana punitive damages law by 
importing the law of foreign jurisdictions through the Louisiana 
Civil Code provisions on conflict of laws. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Even after the Arabie litigation, the issue of punitive damages is 
resurfacing in Louisiana, with history repeating itself. The Louisiana 
courts and the Louisiana Legislature have gone back and forth, 
overruling each other on the issue of punitive damages over the past 
century. The Louisiana Supreme Court refuted the attempts to 
import punitive damages without a specific statutory basis in 
Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana, more than 100 years ago, just as the 
Louisiana Supreme Court recently refuted the attempt to import 
punitive damages without a specific statutory basis in Arabie.  
Arabie shows the need to implement a specific statutory basis for 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to close the door to punitive 
damages and to provide certainty in future litigation involving 
corporations conducting business across multiple jurisdictions. 
Indeed, the Legislature may be the culprit by promulgating flawed 
articles on the conflict of laws and inviting the Trojan Horse of 
punitive damages into Louisiana. Therefore, the Legislature should 
act to clarify the conflict-of-laws provisions, especially those on 
punitive damages in multistate tort conflicts. This would save years of 
litigation in a climate of uncertainty for corporate defendants in both 
state and federal courts. The Legislature must close the door to 
punitive damages and definitively limit the conflict-of-laws articles 
governing punitive damages to only allow those strictly limited codal 
provisions in accordance with legislative intent. 
 
Brooksie L. Bonvillain∗ 
                                                                                                             
 ∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.  
The author would like to thank Professors Elizabeth R. Carter and H. Alston 
Johnson III for their invaluable guidance and boundless patience throughout the 
writing process. The author expresses gratitude to Marshall L. Perkins for his 
constant support as Executive Senior Editor of the Louisiana Law Review, Volume 
73. 
